Suspicious RegAsm or RegSvcs Spawned by Script Host (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-12
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects RegAsm.exe or RegSvcs.exe launched by a script host such as PowerShell, wscript, or cscript, the injection target abused in the Cascading Shadows phishing chain. The actor hollows these signed .NET utilities to run Agent Tesla, Remcos, or XLoader while evading defenses through trusted binary proxy execution.

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Malicious cdb.exe Masquerading as fontdrvhost in ProgramData (via process_creation)
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Suspicious RegAsm or RegSvcs Spawned by Script Host (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1218 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.