Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution From Non-Standard Datop Directory

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-27
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects regsvr32.exe registering a payload located under the non-standard C\Datop directory used by the DatopLoader campaign that exploited ProxyShell to deliver QBot and Cobalt Strike. Attackers abuse regsvr32 to proxy execution of a malicious DLL and evade application controls, so execution from this staging path is a strong loader indicator.

Related detections9 linkedT1218.010 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious DLL Execution via Regsvr32 DllInstall of dat File
Malicious Xctdoor XcLoader Execution via Regsvr32 AppX Path Abuse (via process_creation)
Malicious Office Application Loading a User-Path DLL via Regsvr32 or Rundll32 (via process_creation)
Masquerading SSLoad PhantomLoader DLL Execution via Regsvr32 Silent Load from AppData (via process_creation)
Malicious Kimsuky AlphaSeed Payload Execution via Regsvr32 Loading edge dat (via process_creation)
Malicious Regsvr32 Executing DLL From Windows Temp
HttpSpy Payload Registration via Regsvr32 of Non-DLL File (via process_creation)
Malicious regsvr32 Scriptlet Execution via scrobj.dll
Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution From Non-Standard Datop Directory
Pivot detection · T1218.010 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.