Suspicious Restic Cloud Backup Exfiltration via Renamed winupdate Binary via process_creation

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-24
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Exfiltration
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the restic backup tool being run, including copies renamed to winupdate.exe, with arguments targeting a Wasabi or S3 object store. The threat actor renamed restic to a Windows-update-like name and used it to back up and exfiltrate victim data to attacker-controlled cloud storage, so this pattern indicates staged bulk exfiltration disguised as backup activity.

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Suspicious Data Exfiltration to Telegram Bot API sendDocument (via proxy)
Suspicious Data Exfiltration to Anonymous File Sharing Services (via dns_query)
Suspicious Restic Cloud Backup Exfiltration via Renamed winupdate Binary via process_creation
Pivot detection · T1567.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.