Suspicious RMM Tool Execution from Windows Temp Directory

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-29
Updated
2026-09-29

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects remote monitoring and management binaries such as AnyDesk, MeshAgent, or SimpleHelp executing from the Windows Temp directory, observed during CrushFTP intrusions by Huntress where RMM tools were silently installed for remote access. Attackers stage RMM agents in temporary directories to establish interactive control while masquerading as legitimate software. RMM execution from a non-standard path is a strong indicator of unauthorized remote access.

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Suspicious RMM Tool Execution from Windows Temp Directory
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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.