Suspicious ROADtools User Agent Against Microsoft Graph (via azure)

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion → Lateral Movement

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1550Use Alternate Authentication Material
Cred Access
Discovery
- T1087Account Discovery
Lateral Movement
- T1550Use Alternate Authentication Material
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Entra ID sign-ins and Graph activity carrying the roadtools or generic python-requests user agent, indicating use of the ROADtools and roadtx offensive tooling. Nation-state actors use these tools to register rogue devices, acquire Primary Refresh Tokens, and enumerate directory objects.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1087 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious ROADtools User Agent Against Microsoft Graph (via azure)

Pivot detection · T1087 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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