Suspicious Rogue VeeamBkp Account Creation by Estate Ransomware

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-26
Updated
2026-09-26

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of a rogue local account named VeeamBkp via net user, used by Estate Ransomware operators. The account impersonates a Veeam backup service identity to blend into the environment and retain access. Creation of this disguised account indicates hands-on-keyboard intrusion.

Related detections9 linkedT1136.001 — drag to rearrange
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Malicious Switch User to Rogue Root-Equivalent Account troot (via process_creation)
Malicious Rogue F5 BIG-IP Administrator Account Creation via tmsh (via process_creation)
Suspicious Rogue VeeamBkp Account Creation by Estate Ransomware
Pivot detection · T1136.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.