Suspicious rundll32 Execution of PNG File as DLL

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-22
Updated
2026-09-22

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects rundll32.exe being pointed at a file with a .png extension and a start export, which loads the image as a DLL. Interlock masqueraded its DLL payloads with .png and other benign extensions to bypass file-type inspection and defender expectations. Executing a renamed DLL through rundll32 is a defense-evasion technique used to stage the next loader stage.

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Suspicious rundll32 Execution of PNG File as DLL
Pivot detection · T1218.011 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.