Suspicious rundll32 Execution of sqlite3 DLL by Ordinal with TLB Argument

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-13
Updated
2026-09-13

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects rundll32 loading a sqlite3 DLL by ordinal export #138 together with an x64.tlb argument, the loader invocation used by the Winnti arsenal in Operation CuckooBees. Attackers disguise the malicious payload as a legitimate sqlite3 library and pass a type-library file to trigger execution. This precise ordinal-and-tlb combination is a high-confidence Winnti loader indicator.

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Suspicious rundll32 Execution of sqlite3 DLL by Ordinal with TLB Argument
Pivot detection · T1218.011 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.