Suspicious rundll32 Loading DLL from AppData via DllRegisterServer

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-22
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects rundll32 executing a DLL located under AppData through the DllRegisterServer entry point. OysterLoader stages its COPYING3.dll payload in the roaming profile and runs it with this export. Running an AppData resident DLL through rundll32 with DllRegisterServer is a recognised loader execution pattern.

Related detections9 linkedT1218.011 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Rundll32 Loading an Export From a User Path (via process_creation)
Renamed Regsvr32 or Rundll32 Loading a DLL With a Non-Standard Extension (via process_creation)
Malicious Rundll32 DllRegisterServer Execution From a User-Writable Path (via process_creation)
IMEEX Framework DLL Execution via Rundll32 Loading imaadp (via process_creation)
Suspicious Persistence via pcalua Launching rundll32 Control_RunDLL
Suspicious Rundll32 Executing DLL Start Export With Control Flags
Suspicious Rundll32 Execution of Timestamp-Named DLL
Suspicious Rundll32 Loading DLL from LocalAppData with Short Export (via process_creation)
Malicious Word Spawning Rundll32 Loading DLL from Roaming Word Folder
Suspicious rundll32 Loading DLL from AppData via DllRegisterServer
Pivot detection · T1218.011 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.