Suspicious Salesforce Bulk API Export via aiohttp User Agent

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
salesforce
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-22
Updated
2026-10-22

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion → Collection
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Salesforce Bulk API or large query events originating from a Python aiohttp user agent. Actors abusing compromised Salesloft Drift OAuth tokens use aiohttp to mass export Salesforce data through the Bulk API. Automated aiohttp access to bulk export events indicates token abuse and data theft rather than normal user activity.

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Suspicious Salesforce Bulk API Export via aiohttp User Agent
Pivot detection · T1550.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.