Suspicious Sang Loader Execution with Install or PassUAC Arguments

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
- T1055Process Injection
- T1548Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Defense Evasion
- T1055Process Injection
- T1548Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the Sang.exe loader executing with its install, work or passuac operation arguments. HoneyMyte used Sang.exe with these command modes to install the CoolClient implant and bypass user account control as described by Kaspersky. Execution of this loader with these mode arguments indicates implant installation and privilege escalation.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Sang Loader Execution with Install or PassUAC Arguments

Pivot detection · T1055 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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