Suspicious Scheduled Task Executing Rundll32 DLL Export by Ordinal

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-29
Updated
2026-10-29

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Defense Evasion

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of a scheduled task that launches rundll32.exe against a DLL export referenced by ordinal number which the IcedID actor used to persist an hourly loader on the compromised host and this matters because scheduled execution of an ordinal DLL export by rundll32 is atypical for legitimate software and reflects malware persistence.

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Malicious Renamed Rundll32 Copied to Temp via Xcopy
Suspicious Scheduled Task CacheTask Reconfigured to Run as SYSTEM
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Suspicious Scheduled Task Executing Rundll32 DLL Export by Ordinal
Pivot detection · T1053.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.