Suspicious Scheduled Task Under NetFramework Path via PHANTOMPULSE

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-19
Updated
2026-09-19

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Defense Evasion

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of scheduled tasks placed in the Microsoft Windows NetFramework folder with implant specific names such as DotNetSvcUpdateTask or CoreTask as used by the PHANTOMPULSE RAT in Elastic research. Registering tasks under this seldom populated system path with update themed names provides masqueraded persistence for the backdoor.

Related detections9 linkedT1053.005 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious Scheduled Task Running WScript With JScript Engine
Suspicious SUNBURST EventCacheManager Scheduled Task Artifact (via process_creation)
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation Running VBS at One Minute Interval via Blind Eagle (via process_creation)
Suspicious Latrodectus Payload Execution from Custom_update Directory (via process_creation)
Suspicious Scheduled Task Persistence Named SchedulerLsass via schtasks (via process_creation)
Malicious SYSTEM Persistence via Scheduled Task Running rundll32 at Startup (via process_creation)
Suspicious Per-Minute SYSTEM Scheduled Task With Highest Privileges
Suspicious Scheduled Task Executing Rundll32 DLL Export by Ordinal
Suspicious Scheduled Task Under NetFramework Path via PHANTOMPULSE
Pivot detection · T1053.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.