Suspicious ScreenConnect Remote Access Client Spawning PowerShell (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-14
Updated
2026-10-14

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a ScreenConnect remote-access client process spawning PowerShell or cmd, an abuse of legitimate remote-management software used by the Seashell Blizzard subgroup to run commands on compromised hosts during the BadPilot campaign. Because adversaries co-opt installed RMM tooling to blend into normal administration, scripting children of ScreenConnect warrant scrutiny in environments where such automation is not expected.

Related detections9 linkedT1059.001 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious NetSupport Manager Remote Client Execution (via process_creation)
Suspicious Peach Sandstorm Remote Access via AnyDesk Tooling (via process_creation)
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Suspicious Scheduled Task Launching rundll32 DLL via Ransomware
Suspicious Child Process Spawned by Triofox GladinetCloudMonitor
Suspicious ScreenConnect Remote Access Client Spawning PowerShell (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1059.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.