Suspicious Script Host Executing VBS from ConnectWiseControl Temp Directory

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-02
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects wscript or cscript executing a VBScript dropped under Documents ConnectWiseControl Temp, the staging path used by PhantomControl to run Ande Loader after ScreenConnect delivery. Abusing a remote support tool folder lets attackers stage and run malicious scripts while appearing to be legitimate support automation.

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Suspicious Script Host Executing VBS from ConnectWiseControl Temp Directory
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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.