Suspicious Script Interpreter Executing JavaScript from Temp Folder

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-03
Updated
2026-10-03

ATT&CK techniques

Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects wscript or cscript executing a JavaScript file from a temporary directory which reflects the GootLoader delivery pattern where a JavaScript payload is extracted from a ZIP archive and run from a temp folder. Script based execution from these locations is a common initial foothold for GootLoader infections.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.