Suspicious SD-WAN Compromise Nim Implant C2 Beacon

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-22
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects HTTP requests to the Nim implant endpoints observed in the ongoing Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN exploitation, where the backdoor uses fixed URI paths for handshake and exfiltration. The dedicated /api/v1/handshake and /exfiltrate routes reveal the implant control channel used after webshell deployment. Matching traffic indicates an active Nim implant beaconing from a compromised appliance.

Related detections9 linkedT1071.001 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Data Exfiltration via curl with Stealer Specific BuildID Header
Suspicious Shadow File Exfiltration Over Dev TCP on Linux via Process Creation (via process_creation)
Suspicious Netcat Reverse Shell via Named Pipe on Linux via Process Creation (via process_creation)
Malicious GenAI Browser Extension C2 and PAC Redirection (via proxy)
Possible Prometei Botnet C2 URI Pattern
Malicious PUBLOAD Fake Windows Update C2 Request via Proxy (via proxy)
Possible Lampion C2 Beacon With dados Parameter
Suspicious Non-Standard HTTP Methods Used for Covert C2 (via proxy)
Malicious Splinter Post-Exploitation Implant C2 URI Pattern (via proxy)
Suspicious SD-WAN Compromise Nim Implant C2 Beacon
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.