Suspicious Security Policy Export via SecEdit (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-23
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects secedit.exe exporting the local security policy configuration to a file. Lynx operators used this to enumerate account and password policy during host reconnaissance. Exported policy informs privilege escalation and account manipulation later in the intrusion.

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Suspicious Security Policy Export via SecEdit (via process_creation)
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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.