huntrule

Suspicious Security Policy Export via SecEdit (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-23
Updated
2026-08-28
AnalysisDetection

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects secedit.exe exporting the local security policy configuration to a file. Lynx operators used this to enumerate account and password policy during host reconnaissance. Exported policy informs privilege escalation and account manipulation later in the intrusion.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1082 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious Windows Defender Support Directory Enumeration via Process Creation
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Malicious DinodasRAT Hidden Config File Creation on Linux (via file_event)
Suspicious System Discovery via WMIC Query Commands (via process_creation)
Suspicious PowerShell Host and Locale Reconnaissance via MuddyWater Tsundere Botnet
Suspicious System Reconnaissance Output Redirected to Temp rad File
Suspicious System Profiler Hardware Reconnaissance via BANSHEE
Suspicious Security Policy Export via SecEdit (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1082 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.