Suspicious Service Creation Masquerading as FortiGateUpdate (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-20
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects sc.exe creating a service named FortiGateUpdate whose binary path launches svchost with a service grouping switch. This behavior was observed in Cyber Partisans activity that masqueraded a DNSCat2 tunneling service as a Fortinet update to blend into industrial environments. Detecting the masqueraded service creation exposes the persistence stage of the intrusion.

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Suspicious Service Creation Masquerading as FortiGateUpdate (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1543.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.