Suspicious Service DLL Registration via regsvr32 Silent

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-04
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects regsvr32.exe silently registering a DLL as part of the RONINGLOADER service installation chain that loads goldendays.dll. Adversaries use the silent flag to register malicious DLLs without user-visible prompts while establishing service-based persistence.

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Suspicious Service DLL Registration via regsvr32 Silent
Pivot detection · T1543.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.