Suspicious Service Persistence Masquerading as DevQueryBrokerService

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-05
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Defense Evasion

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of a scheduled task or Windows service named DevQueryBrokerService, a masquerading persistence artifact used by the SADBRIDGE loader that delivers the GOSAR backdoor. The malware installs a service and scheduled task under this benign-looking name to survive reboots and maintain access. The masquerading service name executed through schtasks or sc indicates attacker-controlled persistence rather than a genuine Windows component.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.