Suspicious Service Principal Creation via Azure Audit Logs

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
azure
Service
auditlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-23
Updated
2026-10-23

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of a new service principal in Entra ID, an action attackers perform after illicit OAuth consent to register their own application identity for persistent tenant access. Newly added service principals with broad Graph scopes can read mail and files and move through cloud resources, making unexpected additions a meaningful signal of account or app abuse.

Related detections9 linkedT1098.003 — drag to rearrange
Malicious IAM Group Creation for SES Abuse by JavaGhost (via cloudtrail)
Malicious Administrator Policy Attachment for Privilege Escalation in AWS
Suspicious Azure Contributor Role Assignment to Identity
Malicious GCP Service Account Backdoor via serviceAccountTokenCreator Grant
Suspicious GCP Service Account Impersonation via GenerateAccessToken
Malicious Azure Elevate Access to User Access Administrator
Suspicious Azure Policy Definition or Assignment Modification
Suspicious AWS IAM Role Creation With Cross-Account Trust Policy
Suspicious MURKY PANDA Mail Permission Grant to Service Principal (via azure)
Suspicious Service Principal Creation via Azure Audit Logs
Pivot detection · T1098.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.