Suspicious Shai-Hulud Worm Stager Execution from Temp (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-15
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of the processor.sh or migrate-repos.sh shell scripts from the tmp directory used by the Shai-Hulud npm supply-chain worm. These stagers harvest cloud and repository credentials then drive self-propagation by republishing infected packages. Running these named scripts out of tmp is a direct indicator of the worm on a developer or build host.

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Malicious Shai-Hulud Self-Hosted GitHub Runner Registration via Process Creation
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Suspicious Google Workspace OAuth Authorization for Chrome Web Store Scope via Token Audit
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Suspicious Shai-Hulud Worm Stager Execution from Temp (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1552.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.