Suspicious Shell Spawned by ActiveMQ Java Process

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
- T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application
Execution
- T1059.004Unix Shell
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a Linux shell being spawned as a child of an Apache ActiveMQ Java process, the exploitation pattern of CVE-2023-46604 remote code execution. Attackers trigger the deserialization flaw to run shell commands and fetch second-stage payloads. A Java broker process launching an interactive shell is a clear post-exploitation signal.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Shell Spawned by ActiveMQ Java Process

Pivot detection · T1059.004 · 9 related

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