Suspicious SOAPHound Null Filter LDAP Query via security

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Service
security
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-01
Updated
2026-10-01

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Directory Service event 1644 recording an LDAP search that combines the SOAPHound style negated false filter with a security-descriptor SDflags value of 0x7. This filter construction is used to return every object with its security descriptor in a single sweep, so its presence indicates automated bulk Active Directory collection over ADWS.

Related detections9 linkedT1069.002 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious SOAPHound Style LDAP Query with SDflags and all_with_list via security
Suspicious LDAP Security Descriptor Enumeration via SD_FLAGS Control
Suspicious Delegation Discovery LDAP Search Filter via Bitwise OID
Suspicious Service Principal Name Discovery via setspn Query
Malicious Active Directory Enumeration via SharpHound or BloodHound (via process_creation)
Suspicious Group Discovery - Command (via process_creation)
SharpHound Host Enumeration Over Kerberos (via security)
Suspicious Active Directory Enumeration via ADWS PowerShell Cmdlets via ps_script
Windows File Events: ADExplorer .dat Snapshot Written by ADExp.exe or ADExplorer.exe
Suspicious SOAPHound Null Filter LDAP Query via security
Pivot detection · T1069.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.