Suspicious SonicWall SSL-VPN Reconnaissance Endpoints via Webserver

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
webserver
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-25
Updated
2026-09-25

ATT&CK techniques

Recon → Initial Access
  1. Resource Dev

  2. Execution

  3. Persistence

  4. Priv Esc

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects HTTP requests to SonicWall SSL-VPN and management endpoints characteristic of automated reconnaissance, including /api/sonicos/is-sslvpn-enabled and /sonicui/7/login/. An active campaign delivered through commercial proxy infrastructure enumerates these endpoints to identify exploitable SonicWall firewalls before attempting credential attacks or exploitation. Detecting this enumeration lets defenders identify and block scanning infrastructure early.

Related detections9 linkedT1190 — drag to rearrange
Malicious WordPress Core SQL Injection Scanner via User-Agent
Suspicious SonicWall Access With Anomalous Chrome Linux User Agent via Webserver
Suspicious BeyondTrust Remote Support Probing of nw Endpoint via Webserver
Suspicious Access to Spring Boot Actuator Heapdump Endpoint
Suspicious Cisco ASA WebVPN Login Scanning with Spoofed Chrome User-Agent
DNS Queries to OAST and Callback Domain Services
ToolShell SharePoint CVE-2025-53770 Exploitation via ToolPane Endpoint With SignOut Referer (via webserver)
Malicious Next.js Node Process Spawning Shell Downloader after RSC Deserialization RCE (via process_creation)
SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation via ToolPane POST with SignOut Referer (via webserver)
Suspicious SonicWall SSL-VPN Reconnaissance Endpoints via Webserver
Pivot detection · T1190 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.