Suspicious storagekitd Spawning Third-Party Filesystem Binary from Library Filesystems (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
macos
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-14
Updated
2026-10-14

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the SIP-heritable daemon storagekitd spawning a third-party filesystem binary located under /Library/Filesystems, the core behavior of the macOS System Integrity Protection bypass tracked as CVE-2024-44243. Adversaries abuse storagekitd com.apple.rootless.install.heritable entitlement to run attacker-controlled newfs and fsck helpers with SIP-bypassing privileges, making early detection critical for stopping kernel extension loading and rootkit installation.

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Suspicious storagekitd Spawning Third-Party Filesystem Binary from Library Filesystems (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1548 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.