Suspicious ThrottleStop Driver Abuse for Defense Evasion in Ransomware Attacks

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-11
Updated
2026-09-11

ATT&CK techniques

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of the ThrottleStop utility which ships a vulnerable driver abused to disable endpoint protection. Ransomware operators in Japanese incidents load ThrottleStop as part of their EDR-killer tooling before encryption. Bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver tools let an actor terminate security software from kernel space.

Related detections9 linkedT1685 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious Windows Defender Exclusion Added for ProgramData (via process_creation)
Windows Firewall Disabled via netsh advfirewall
Malicious Known Vulnerable Driver Load for BYOVD Attack
Malicious Qilin EDR Killer BYOVD Driver Load
Malicious Windows Defender Exclusion Added (via registry_set)
Suspicious Termination of Windows Security Health UI via taskkill
Suspicious ThrottleStop Driver Abuse for Defense Evasion in Ransomware Attacks
Pivot detection · T1685 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.