Suspicious Trojanized ScreenConnect Client Installer with Guest Relay Parameters (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-01
Updated
2026-09-01

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the ScreenConnect client setup executed with the guest session and relay host parameters used by trojanized installers that drop AsyncRAT and PureHVNC on a single machine. Adversaries embed the e Support y Guest and h relay-host arguments so the agent silently connects to attacker infrastructure. The parameter combination distinguishes weaponized installers from legitimate deployments.

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Suspicious Trojanized ScreenConnect Client Installer with Guest Relay Parameters (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1219 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.