Suspicious TruffleHog Execution Spawned by Bun Runtime via Process Creation

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-24
Updated
2026-10-24

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access → Collection
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the Bun JavaScript runtime spawning the TruffleHog secret scanner, a behavior chain used by the Shai-Hulud worm to harvest credentials from developer and CI environments. Adversaries abuse the legitimate TruffleHog tool during package install hooks to locate secrets before exfiltrating them, so this parent-child pairing is a strong indicator of automated credential collection.

Related detections9 linkedT1552.001 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Recursive Credential and Wallet Search Written to Temp Inventory File
Linux File Events: Malicious GitHub Workflow File Creation (shai-hulud-workflow*.yml/yaml)
Windows Process Creation: Automated Document and Directory Discovery via dir and findstr
Malicious AWS Credential Exfiltration via Curl or Wget in Process Creation
Suspicious sqlite3 Access to gcloud Cached Access Token Database (via process_creation)
Suspicious AWS GetCallerIdentity From TruffleHog User Agent via Cloudtrail
Suspicious GitHub CLI Auth Token Extraction via Command Line
Suspicious Access to macOS Login Keychain by Slow Pisces (via process_creation)
Suspicious mdfind Search for Private Key Files on macOS (via process_creation)
Suspicious TruffleHog Execution Spawned by Bun Runtime via Process Creation
Pivot detection · T1552.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.