Suspicious Typosquatted Apple User-Agent Beaconing from Ivanti Implant (via proxy)

ATT&CK techniques

C2

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
- T1071.001Web Protocols
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects HTTP requests bearing a typosquatted Apple user-agent string that substitutes look-alike characters for the letter l. Implants deployed against Ivanti Connect Secure used App1e and AppIe user-agents during their dormancy and beaconing. A user-agent forging the Apple brand with homoglyphs is a distinctive command-and-control fingerprint.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Typosquatted Apple User-Agent Beaconing from Ivanti Implant (via proxy)

Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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