Suspicious UPDTAE Backdoor Reverse Shell HTTP Beacon via Quad7 Operators

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-07
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects HTTP requests carrying the hardcoded User-Agent value IOT together with POST requests to the /iot/post URI, the reverse shell beaconing pattern of the UPDTAE backdoor deployed by the Quad7 operators. The implant polls its C2 roughly every thirty seconds using this fixed header and path. The unusual static User-Agent and endpoint make this a reliable network indicator.

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Suspicious UPDTAE Backdoor Reverse Shell HTTP Beacon via Quad7 Operators
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.