Suspicious User Home Directory Modification via dscl Process Creation

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
- T1548Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Defense Evasion
- T1548Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects use of dscl to change a user account home directory, the core step of the macOS HM Surf technique that relocates the home path to tamper with Safari privacy preference files and bypass TCC protections. Modifying NFSHomeDirectory lets an attacker point sensitive Safari config to a controlled location and grant itself camera, microphone or location access.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious User Home Directory Modification via dscl Process Creation

Pivot detection · T1548 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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