Suspicious VBA Runtime Loaded by Process from OneNote Exported Directory

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
image_load
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-15
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a process running from the OneNote exported attachment or temp directory loading the VBE7.dll VBA runtime, indicating macro or script execution from a weaponised OneNote embedded file. Legitimate applications rarely execute from the OneNote Exported path, so loading the VBA engine from there signals malicious code launched via a OneNote phishing lure.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.