Suspicious vbc.exe Spawned by Installer Process

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1204.002Malicious File
Persistence
Priv Esc
- T1055Process Injection
Defense Evasion
- T1055Process Injection
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the Visual Basic compiler vbc.exe being launched by a Setup or installer process, the injection host behavior of malware spread through cracked-software YouTube lures. Attackers hollow vbc.exe to run beaconing code that persists after the installer exits. A compiler binary spawned by an installer and used as a network beacon host is highly anomalous.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious vbc.exe Spawned by Installer Process

Pivot detection · T1055 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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