Suspicious VBScript Execution from ProgramLogs Directory via Windows Script Host

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.005Visual Basic
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the Windows script host executing a VBScript from a non standard ProgramLogs directory used in the Lazarus shellcode execution chain analysed by NCC Group. Placement of scripts in an atypical top level folder is a masquerading and staging technique preceding shellcode injection.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1059.005 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious Script Execution of Disk.vbs from Templates Directory (via process_creation)

Suspicious AutoIt3 Execution With Compiled Script Argument via Process Creation

Suspicious VBScript Execution from ProgramLogs Directory via Windows Script Host

Pivot detection · T1059.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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