Suspicious Velociraptor DFIR Agent Spawning Encoded PowerShell

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-30
Updated
2026-09-30

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the Velociraptor DFIR agent spawning PowerShell with an encoded command, matching attacker misuse of Velociraptor running as LocalSystem to execute payloads following WSUS exploitation. Adversaries repurpose the legitimate incident response tool to run covert commands with high privilege. Velociraptor launching encoded PowerShell outside sanctioned hunts is anomalous.

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Suspicious Windows Service Installed with PHP-CLI ImagePath in MagicINFO Path
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Silent AnyDesk Remote Access Tool Installation
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Suspicious Velociraptor DFIR Agent Spawning Encoded PowerShell
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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.