huntrule

Suspicious Windows Event Log Cleared during StilachiRAT Anti-Forensics (via security)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Service
security
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-08
Updated
2026-08-28
AnalysisDetection

ATT&CK techniques

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the clearing of the Windows Security event log, an anti-forensic action performed by StilachiRAT which monitors event IDs and wipes logs to erase traces of its reconnaissance and cryptocurrency-theft activity. Adversaries clear logs to frustrate incident response after credential and wallet theft, so a 1102 log-clear event outside sanctioned maintenance is a strong tampering indicator.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1685.005 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil (via process_creation)
Malicious USN Change Journal Deletion via Fsutil for Anti-Forensics
Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil
Suspicious Windows Event Log Cleared via wevtutil during Ransomware Staging (via process_creation)
Suspicious Deletion of Terminal Server Client History via reg by UNC1549
Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via process_creation
Malicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via Renamed Log Utility
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via PowerShell Invoke-Expression
Suspicious Windows Event Log Cleared during StilachiRAT Anti-Forensics (via security)
Pivot detection · T1685.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.