huntrule

Suspicious Windows Event Log Cleared via wevtutil during Ransomware Staging (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-14
Updated
2026-10-14
AnalysisDetection

ATT&CK techniques

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects wevtutil clearing an event log, the anti-forensic action taken during the CLFS zero-day intrusion to erase evidence before ransomware encryption. Adversaries clear logs such as Application to hinder response after credential theft and recovery inhibition, so wevtutil cl outside sanctioned maintenance is an indicator of tampering.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1685.005 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Deletion of Terminal Server Client History via reg by UNC1549
Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via process_creation
Malicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via Renamed Log Utility
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via PowerShell Invoke-Expression
Malicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil (via process_creation)
Malicious Windows Event Log and Backup Clearing by BabLock Ransomware
Malicious Windows Event Log Clearing via Wevtutil
Malicious Security Event Log Disabled via wevtutil
Suspicious Windows Event Log Cleared via wevtutil during Ransomware Staging (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1685.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.