Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via process_creation

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-08
Updated
2026-10-08

ATT&CK techniques

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects clearing of Windows event logs through the PowerShell Clear-EventLog cmdlet or the wevtutil clear-log command which attackers use to destroy forensic evidence. Head Mare and Twelve piped Get-EventLog into Clear-EventLog to wipe activity during their intrusion. Log clearing is a defense evasion action that should almost never occur outside of controlled maintenance.

Related detections9 linkedT1685.005 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via Renamed Log Utility
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via PowerShell Invoke-Expression
Malicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil (via process_creation)
Malicious Windows Event Log and Backup Clearing by BabLock Ransomware
Malicious Windows Event Log Clearing via Wevtutil
Malicious Security Event Log Disabled via wevtutil
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via Wevtutil (via process_creation)
Suspicious Mass Windows Event Log Clearing via PowerShell (via ps_script)
Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via process_creation
Pivot detection · T1685.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.