huntrule

Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-16
Updated
2026-10-16
AnalysisDetection

ATT&CK techniques

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects use of wevtutil to clear Windows event logs which ransomware operators use to destroy forensic evidence during an intrusion. Observed in NCC Group research into active ransomware families. Clearing event logs is a defense-evasion and anti-forensic behavior that rarely occurs in normal administration.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1685.005 — drag to rearrange
Malicious USN Change Journal Deletion via Fsutil for Anti-Forensics
Suspicious Windows Event Log Cleared via wevtutil during Ransomware Staging (via process_creation)
Suspicious Deletion of Terminal Server Client History via reg by UNC1549
Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via process_creation
Malicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via Renamed Log Utility
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via PowerShell Invoke-Expression
Malicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil (via process_creation)
Malicious Windows Event Log and Backup Clearing by BabLock Ransomware
Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil
Pivot detection · T1685.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.