Suspicious Windows Process Creation as SYSTEM User with Likely Credential/Defense Evasion Commands
Flags SYSTEM-context process executions on Windows that include suspicious tool names or command-line patterns such as PowerShell/Mimikatz indicators.
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title: Suspicious Windows Process Creation as SYSTEM User with Likely Credential/Defense Evasion Commands
id: b0563ef4-5158-40df-9a97-3e5fac66c0d2
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process creation events where the process runs under the SYSTEM security context (IntegrityLevel values like System and S-1-16-16384) and the image or command line matches a set of suspicious tool and behavior indicators. The activity matters because attackers commonly leverage SYSTEM execution to perform stealthy credential access, privilege escalation, and persistence using built-in binaries or encoded PowerShell and Mimikatz-like command patterns. It relies on process creation telemetry including the creating user/integrity context, process image path, command line, and parent process details for multiple false-positive filters.
references:
- Internal Research
- https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_system_user_anomaly.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), David ANDRE (additional keywords), Huntrule Team
date: 2021-12-20
modified: 2025-10-19
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1134
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1027
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
IntegrityLevel:
- System
- S-1-16-16384
User|contains:
- AUTHORI
- AUTORI
selection_special:
- Image|endswith:
- \calc.exe
- \cscript.exe
- \forfiles.exe
- \hh.exe
- \mshta.exe
- \ping.exe
- \wscript.exe
- CommandLine|re: net\s+user\s+
- CommandLine|contains:
- " -NoP "
- " -W Hidden "
- " -decode "
- " /decode "
- " /urlcache "
- " -urlcache "
- " -e* JAB"
- " -e* SUVYI"
- " -e* SQBFAFgA"
- " -e* aWV4I"
- " -e* IAB"
- " -e* PAA"
- " -e* aQBlAHgA"
- vssadmin delete shadows
- reg SAVE HKLM
- " -ma "
- Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
- .downloadstring(
- .downloadfile(
- " /ticket:"
- "dpapi::"
- event::clear
- event::drop
- id::modify
- "kerberos::"
- "lsadump::"
- "misc::"
- "privilege::"
- "rpc::"
- "sekurlsa::"
- "sid::"
- "token::"
- vault::cred
- vault::list
- " p::d "
- ;iex(
- MiniDump
filter_main_ping:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ping
- 127.0.0.1
- " -n "
filter_vs:
Image|endswith: \PING.EXE
ParentCommandLine|contains: \DismFoDInstall.cmd
filter_config_mgr:
ParentImage|contains: :\Packages\Plugins\Microsoft.GuestConfiguration.ConfigurationforWindows\
filter_java:
ParentImage|contains:
- :\Program Files (x86)\Java\
- :\Program Files\Java\
ParentImage|endswith: \bin\javaws.exe
Image|contains:
- :\Program Files (x86)\Java\
- :\Program Files\Java\
Image|endswith: \bin\jp2launcher.exe
CommandLine|contains: " -ma "
condition: all of selection* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Administrative activity
- Scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
- Monitoring activity
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 2617e7ed-adb7-40ba-b0f3-8f9945fe6c09
type: derived
What it detects
This rule flags Windows process creation events where the process runs under the SYSTEM security context (IntegrityLevel values like System and S-1-16-16384) and the image or command line matches a set of suspicious tool and behavior indicators. The activity matters because attackers commonly leverage SYSTEM execution to perform stealthy credential access, privilege escalation, and persistence using built-in binaries or encoded PowerShell and Mimikatz-like command patterns. It relies on process creation telemetry including the creating user/integrity context, process image path, command line, and parent process details for multiple false-positive filters.
Known false positives
- Administrative activity
- Scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
- Monitoring activity
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.