Suspicious Windows Process Creation as SYSTEM User with Likely Credential/Defense Evasion Commands
Flags SYSTEM-context process executions on Windows that include suspicious tool names or command-line patterns such as PowerShell/Mimikatz indicators.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), David ANDRE (additional keywords) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2021-12-20
- Updated
- 2026-07-30
ATT&CK techniques
Priv Esc → Cred AccessRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags Windows process creation events where the process runs under the SYSTEM security context (IntegrityLevel values like System and S-1-16-16384) and the image or command line matches a set of suspicious tool and behavior indicators. The activity matters because attackers commonly leverage SYSTEM execution to perform stealthy credential access, privilege escalation, and persistence using built-in binaries or encoded PowerShell and Mimikatz-like command patterns. It relies on process creation telemetry including the creating user/integrity context, process image path, command line, and parent process details for multiple false-positive filters.
Reporting behind it
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Suspicious Windows Process Creation as SYSTEM User with Likely Credential/Defense Evasion Commands
id: b0563ef4-5158-40df-9a97-3e5fac66c0d2
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process creation events where the process runs under the SYSTEM security context (IntegrityLevel values like System and S-1-16-16384) and the image or command line matches a set of suspicious tool and behavior indicators. The activity matters because attackers commonly leverage SYSTEM execution to perform stealthy credential access, privilege escalation, and persistence using built-in binaries or encoded PowerShell and Mimikatz-like command patterns. It relies on process creation telemetry including the creating user/integrity context, process image path, command line, and parent process details for multiple false-positive filters.
references:
- Internal Research
- https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_system_user_anomaly.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), David ANDRE (additional keywords), Huntrule Team
date: 2021-12-20
modified: 2025-10-19
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1134
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1027
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
IntegrityLevel:
- System
- S-1-16-16384
User|contains:
- AUTHORI
- AUTORI
selection_special:
- Image|endswith:
- \calc.exe
- \cscript.exe
- \forfiles.exe
- \hh.exe
- \mshta.exe
- \ping.exe
- \wscript.exe
- CommandLine|re: net\s+user\s+
- CommandLine|contains:
- " -NoP "
- " -W Hidden "
- " -decode "
- " /decode "
- " /urlcache "
- " -urlcache "
- " -e* JAB"
- " -e* SUVYI"
- " -e* SQBFAFgA"
- " -e* aWV4I"
- " -e* IAB"
- " -e* PAA"
- " -e* aQBlAHgA"
- vssadmin delete shadows
- reg SAVE HKLM
- " -ma "
- Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
- .downloadstring(
- .downloadfile(
- " /ticket:"
- "dpapi::"
- event::clear
- event::drop
- id::modify
- "kerberos::"
- "lsadump::"
- "misc::"
- "privilege::"
- "rpc::"
- "sekurlsa::"
- "sid::"
- "token::"
- vault::cred
- vault::list
- " p::d "
- ;iex(
- MiniDump
filter_main_ping:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ping
- 127.0.0.1
- " -n "
filter_vs:
Image|endswith: \PING.EXE
ParentCommandLine|contains: \DismFoDInstall.cmd
filter_config_mgr:
ParentImage|contains: :\Packages\Plugins\Microsoft.GuestConfiguration.ConfigurationforWindows\
filter_java:
ParentImage|contains:
- :\Program Files (x86)\Java\
- :\Program Files\Java\
ParentImage|endswith: \bin\javaws.exe
Image|contains:
- :\Program Files (x86)\Java\
- :\Program Files\Java\
Image|endswith: \bin\jp2launcher.exe
CommandLine|contains: " -ma "
condition: all of selection* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Administrative activity
- Scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
- Monitoring activity
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 2617e7ed-adb7-40ba-b0f3-8f9945fe6c09
type: derived