Suspicious Windows Service Executing Batch File from Temp Directory

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1543.003Windows Service
Priv Esc
- T1543.003Windows Service
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Windows service creation whose ImagePath runs cmd.exe against a batch file staged in a temp directory, observed by Huntress where a masquerading service named WebrootCheck launched a batch file from c colon temp. Attackers register a legitimate-looking service to execute attacker scripts with SYSTEM privileges and persist. A service that runs a temp-directory batch file combines a benign-looking name with a suspicious execution context and is a strong persistence indicator.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Windows Service Executing Batch File from Temp Directory

Pivot detection · T1543.003 · 9 related

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