Suspicious Windows Service Installed with PHP-CLI ImagePath in MagicINFO Path

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Service
system
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-29
Updated
2026-09-29

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Windows service creation where the ImagePath points to php-cli.exe under the MagicINFO tomcat directory, a persistence mechanism Huntress observed after exploitation of the Samsung MagicINFO 9 server. Attackers register a masqueraded service, often via srvany, to run a PHP interpreter and maintain execution. A service whose binary is a scripting interpreter in an application directory is a strong persistence indicator.

Related detections9 linkedT1543.003 — drag to rearrange
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Malicious Windows Service Installation Executing a Script Interpreter (via process_creation)
Malicious Service Permissions Hijacked for Privileges Abuse - PowerShell (via powershell)
Malicious Service Created With Binary Path in ProgramData
Malicious Abyss Locker wmihelper SSH Backdoor Deployment (via file_event)
Malicious AuKill EDR Killer Kernel Driver Load via Process Explorer Driver (via image_load)
Suspicious TermService ServiceDll Hijack via Registry (via registry_set)
Suspicious Service Creation Named RDP-Controller via sc.exe (via process_creation)
Suspicious Service or Task Named windowsinspectionupdate (via process_creation)
Suspicious Windows Service Installed with PHP-CLI ImagePath in MagicINFO Path
Pivot detection · T1543.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.