Suspicious WMIC Execution from Anomalous Parent Process (via process_creation)

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Discovery

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1047Windows Management Instrumentation
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
- T1016System Network Configuration Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects wmic being spawned by an anomalous parent such as an Office application, browser or scripting host. Legitimate WMIC use rarely originates from these processes, so this parent-child relationship points to WMI being abused for execution or discovery following initial access.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious WMIC Execution from Anomalous Parent Process (via process_creation)

Pivot detection · T1047 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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