Suspicious WScript Execution Spawned by Microsoft Word (via process_creation)

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.005Visual Basic
- T1204.002Malicious File
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects wscript.exe spawned as a child of Microsoft Word, indicating macro-driven script execution. The returning Bumblebee campaign used a macro-enabled document that dropped a temp script and ran it via wscript to fetch the loader.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious WScript Execution Spawned by Microsoft Word (via process_creation)

Pivot detection · T1059.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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