Suspicious Zsh Persistence via zshrc_aliases Appended to Shell Startup (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
macos
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-14
Updated
2026-10-14

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects references to a .zshrc_aliases file, the shell-profile persistence artifact that the updated XCSSET malware writes and sources from the user .zshrc to relaunch itself on each new terminal session. Adversaries hide persistence inside auxiliary zsh startup files to avoid altering the more commonly monitored .zshrc directly, so activity touching .zshrc_aliases is an indicator of shell-based persistence.

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Suspicious Zsh Persistence via zshrc_aliases Appended to Shell Startup (via process_creation)
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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.