SynkLoader Python Stager Execution from AppData via pythonw (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-30
Updated
2026-08-30

ATT&CK techniques

Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the SynkLoader Python stager launched by pythonw.exe from a randomly named AppData subdirectory using the fl\ang\ss.py path layout observed after a Microsoft Teams phishing lure. Adversaries run the loader silently to decrypt and inject follow-on modules while evading command-line script inspection, making early detection critical for stopping module deployment before credential theft.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.